a revelation is possible,

THERE IS NOTHING IMPROBABLE OR UNREASONABLE IN THE IDEA OF A REVELATION FROM GOD; AND CONSEQUENTLY, NOTHING IMPROBABLE OR UNREASONABLE IN SUCH A MANIFEST DIVINE INTERPOSITION, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH A REVELATION.

THAT a revelation is possible, will not be called in question by any who believe in the existance of a God; nor can it be believed that there is any thing in the notion of a revelation, repugnant to the moral attributes of the Supreme Being. It cannot be inconsistent with the wisdom, goodness, or holiness of God, to increase the knowledge of his intelligent creatures. The whole end of a revelation is to make men wiser, better, and happier; and what can be conceived more accordant with our ideas of divine perfection, than this?

That man is capable of receiving benefit from a revelation, is a truth so evident, that it would be folly to spend time in demonstrating it; for whatever may be thought of the sufficiency of Natural Religion, if it was fully understood and improved; yet all must admit, that men, generally, have not been sufficiently enlightened on the subject of religion. The history of the world, in all ages, proves the deplorable ignorance of the greater part of the human race, even on those subjects, which the advocates of Natural Religion, confess to be most important and fundamental, as has been proved in the preceding chapter.

It cannot be thought an unreasonable supposition, that when God made the original progenitors of our race, he should furnish them with such knowledge as was absolutely necessary, not only for their comfort, but for their preservation. As they were without experience, and had none upon earth from whom they could derive instruction, is it unreasonable to suppose, that the beneficent Creator communicated to them such a stock of knowledge, as was requisite for the common purposes of life? The theory of those who suppose, that man was at first a dumb, irrational animal, very little different from those which now roam the forest;—and that from this state lie emerged by his own exertions;—that he invented articulate speech, and all the arts of life, without ever receiving any aid, or any revelation from his Creator, has already been sufficiently refuted.

If, then, man received, at first, such ideas as were necessary to his condition, this was a revelation; and if afterwards he should at any time need information, on any subject connected with his happiness, why might not the benevolent Creator, who does not abandon the work of his hands, again vouchsafe to make a communication to him? Such an exigency, deists themselves being judges, did arise. Men, almost universally, fell into the practice of idolatry, and lost the knowledge of the true God. They betook themselves to the worship of the luminaries of heaven, of dead men, of beasts, and inanimate things. They invented superstitious rites, not only irrational, but cruel and abominable. These were transmitted from generation to generation; and the children became still more involved in ignorance, than their parents. Now, that
the righteous Governor of the universe may leave men to follow their own inventions, and suffer by their own folly, is certain; for he has done so. But is it not consistent with his wisdom and goodness to use extraordinary means to rescue them from a state so degraded and wretched? Would not every sober deist admit, that some means of bringing them back to just ideas of Natural Religion would be desirable? If then the apostacy of man from his Maker should render some farther revelation necessary, would it not be highly benevolent to communicate whatever knowledge his circumstances required? Why would it be thought unreasonable, that God should sometimes depart from his common mode of acting, to answer great and valuable ends? What is there in the established course of nature so sacred or so immutable, that it must never on any occasion or for any purpose be changed? The only reason why the laws of nature are uniform, is, that this is for the benefit of man, but if his interest requires a departure from the regular course, what is there to render it unreasonable? The Author of the universe has never hound himself to pursue one undeviating course, in the government of the world. The time may come when he may think proper to change the whole system. As he gave it a beginning, he may also give it an end. General uniformity is expedient, that men may know what to expect, and may have encouragement to use means to obtain necessary ends; but occasional and unfrequent deviations from this uniformity have no tendency to prevent the benefit arising from it. This is so evident a truth that I am almost ashamed to dwell so long upon it; but by the sophistry of infidels a strange darkness
has been thrown over the subject, so that it seems to be thought that there would be something immoral, or unwise and inconsistent, in contravening the laws of nature

Let it be remembered that the object here is not to prove that there must be a revelation; it is only to show that there would be nothing unreasonable in the thing; and farther, that it would be a very desirable thing for man, and altogether consistent with the perfections of God, and the principles on which he governs the world.

If God should determine to reveal his will to man, how could this be most conveniently effected? We can conceive of two ways. The first, by inspiring all who needed knowledge with the ideas which he wished to communicate. The second, by inspiring a few persons, and directing them to make known to others the truths received. The first would seem to be the most effectual, but the last is mose analogous to his other dispensations. Reason might have been given in perfection at once, and not left to the uncertainty of education and human improvement; but such is not the fact. By slow degrees and much culture this faculty attains its maturity, and when neglected never acquires any high degree of strength. In regard to the best mode of making a revelation, however, we are totally incompetent to judge; but of one thing we may be certain, that if God should give a revelation to men, he would so attest it as to enable all sincere inquirers to know that it derives its origin from him; for otherwise it would be useless, as there would be no evidence of its truth. Supposing a revelation to be given, what would be a satisfactory attestation of its divine origin? It must be some sign or evidence not capable of being 
counterfeited; something by which God should in some way manifest himself. And how could this be effected, but by the exertion of his power or the manifestation of his infinite knowledge? That is, by miracles, or by prophecies, or by both. There is then just as much probability that miracles will exist, (for prophecy may be considered one kind of miracle) as that a revelation will he given. The conjunction of these two things is reasonable; if we find the one, we may be sure the other exists also.

It is admitted that a revelation from God would have internal evidence of its origin, but this does not strike the attention at once. It requires time before it can be perceived; but in the first establishment of a revelation, there is need of some evidence which is obvious to the senses and level to the capacities of all. Just such an evidence are miracles. Moreover, internal evidence requires, in order that it may be perceived and appreciated, a certain favourable state of the moral feeling, without which it is apt to be overlooked, and produces no conviction; whereas external evidence is not only level to every capacity, but adapted to bring home conviction to every description of men, to the bad as well as the good.

Miracles then furnish the best proof for the establishment of a revelation. They seem to be its proper seal. They are the manifest attestation of God. Nothing can be conceived which will more strikingly indicate his power and presence than a visible suspension of the laws of nature. He is invisible: he must make himself known by his works, and a miracle is such a work as no other can perform. 7